DePaul Journal of Art, Technology
& Intellectual Property Law
Volume 11
Issue 2 Fall 2001

Article 3

Copyright and Contracts: The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts under 28 U.S.C. 1338(A)
Daniel E. Wanat

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip

Recommended Citation
Daniel E. Wanat, Copyright and Contracts: The Subject Matter Jurisdiction of Federal Courts under 28
U.S.C. 1338(A), 11 DePaul J. Art, Tech. & Intell. Prop. L. 361 (2001)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol11/iss2/3

This Lead Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law by an authorized
editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.
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COPYRIGHT AND CONTRACTS: THE
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION OF
FEDERAL COURTS UNDER 28 U.S.C. §

1338(A)

Daniel E. Wanat*
I. INTRODUCTION

A. The Problem
The subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts under the
United States Copyright Act is said to present one of the "knottiest
procedural problems in copyright jurisprudence." 2 That problem
may be stated as follows: when does a copyright claim or issue
under the Copyright Act which is factually related to a state law
contract claim or issue constitute a "civil action arising under any
Act of Congress relating to ...copyrights" sufficient to invoke
exclusive federal court jurisdiction? 3 This problem serves as the
* Professor of Law, The University of Memphis, Cecil C. Humphreys
School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge The University of Memphis
Foundation for the funds it provided in support of the research and writing of
this article. Also, the author wishes to thank his research assistant, Bradley
Smith, for his contribution to the preparation of this article.
2 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
12.01[A], at 12-4 (Matthew Bender & Co. ed., 2000). The problem concerns
the division of jurisdiction between the federal courts and state courts.
3 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1993 & Supp. 2001). This grant of subject matter
jurisdiction provides, in part, that: "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to...
copyrights ....Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in
...copyright cases."
If the answer to the question of whether the factually related copyright and
contract claims result in a "civil action arising under" the Copyright Act is in the
affirmative, a United States district court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
copyright claim. Should the plaintiff to the copyright claim join the contract
claim, a second jurisdictional question arises, namely, does the federal court
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foundation for this article.
Since it is helpful to bring the problem into relief, the facts of a
case decided recently in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, Bassett v. MashantucketPequot Tribe, are offered
for consideration
as are the holdings of the district court and court
4
of appeals.
B. The ProblemIllustrated
Debra Bassett operated a television and film production
company, Bassett Productions.5 In 1995 that company entered into
an agreement with the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe ("Tribe") under
which the company was to develop and produce a film depicting
the "Pequot War of 1636-38.I6
Debra Bassett prepared a script for the film, which she delivered
to the Tribe. 7 Subsequently, the Tribe wrote to Bassett terminating
have subject matter jurisdiction over the latter claim? In this regard, if the
parties to the contracts claim are of diverse citizenship, the United States district
court would have jurisdiction within limits. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1993). Also it
appears that the district court would have pendent jurisdiction over the contracts
claim. See, e.g., Frederick Fell Publishers v. Lorayne, 422 F.Supp. 808
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Pendent jurisdiction invoked). See also SAPC, Inc. v. Lotus
Dev. Corp., 699 F. Supp 1009 (D.Mass 1988); Kleinberger v. Allen Prods. Co.,
Inc., 581 F. Supp. 941 (D.C. Pa. 1984); Powell v. Green Hill Publishers, Inc.,
719 F. Supp. 743 (N.D. Il. 1989). In any event, should pendent jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) (1993 & Supp. 2001) be unavailable, the
copyright/contracts plaintiff may be able to invoke the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
1367 (1993)("supplemental jurisdiction"). See Craig Joyce et. al., Copyright
Law at 666 (5th. ed. 2000).
4 Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000). The
Bassett opinion will be analyzed later in this article. See infra notes 157-185
and accompanying text.
5Id.at 346.
6
Id. Prior to this agreement, the Tribe's representative executed a
nondisclosure agreement in which all information the Tribe received from
Bassett Productions was considered proprietary and was to be returned to that
company at its request.
7Id.The script bore a notice of copyright prominently displayed on its first
page. Subsequently, Bassett registered this script and "script scenarios" on
which it was based with the Copyright Office.
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its agreement with Bassett Productions. 8 The Tribe, sans Bassett
or Bassett Productions, continued with the film's development and
completed the motion picture in October10 1996. 9 The Tribe
intended to screen the picture at its Museum.
In September 1996, Debra Bassett sued the Tribe in the District
of Connecticut." Bassett's complaint alleged that the Tribe used
her copyrighted script to make its movie without Bassett's license
or consent. 12 Bassett sought various copyright remedies including
an injunction. 3 The complaint further alleged that the Tribe was
and that it
in breach of its 1995 agreement with Bassett's company
4
committed state law torts which injured Ms. Bassett.'

8

Id. The Tribe notified Bassett that it was terminating the agreement because of
nonperformance of the contract.
9Bassett, 204 F.3d at 346.
10
Id.
1 Id. The district court's jurisdiction was sought under § 1338(a) as the plaintiff
claimed the action arose under the Copyright Act.
It appears that in this case as well as others a plaintiff may be able to assert that
the United States district court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331. This provision within the Judiciary Act provides: "The district court
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993 & Supp. 2001).
laws,
121id.
13 Id. The Museum, which was to exhibit the film, was also named as a
defendant against whom copyright remedies were sought. Id. Although not
discussed within the opinion, it appears that the plaintiff was claiming an
infringement of her copyright under Section 501 of the Copyright Act of 1976.
17 U.S.C. § 501 (1996 & Supp. 2001). This section provides, in part, that
"anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner... is
an infinger of the copyright." Id. at (a). The "exclusive rights of the owner"
are found in Section 106 of the Copyright Act and include a reproduction right
and a right of public performance. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1), (4) (1996 & Supp.
2001). Both rights may have been violated by the Bassett defendants. Once
such rights are violated the "owner of an exclusive right ... is entitled.., to
institute an action for infringement." 17 U.S.C. § 501 (b) (1996 & Supp. 2001).
One of the many remedies provided for by the Copyright Act is an injunction.

at § 502.
Id.
14

Bassett, 204 F.3d at 346. The complaint further alleged that representatives
of the Tribe committed infringement of copyrights in violation of federal law as
well as claims actionable under state law.
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The Tribe moved to dismiss the complaint. 15 It argued, in part,
that the court lacked federal question jurisdiction because Bassett's
copyright infringement claim was "'incidental to' her
contract
16
claims, and therefore, did not 'arise under' federal law."'
The district court accepted this "incidental to" approach and
granted the motion to dismiss.' 7 On appeal, the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit concluded that in cases where copyright
infringement claims arise from, or are "in the context of," an
alleged breach of contract claim, federal jurisdiction under §
1338(a) exists "when the complaint alleges a claim or seeks a
remedy under the Copyright Act."' 8
C. An Overview of the Problem Analyzed
In Part III, this article will address the two divergent approaches
that are reflected in the holdings of the district court and court of

15 Id.
16 Id.

It appears that the plaintiff asserted the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court based solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Id. at 347.
17 Id. In doing so, the court applied a test for deciding the § 1338(a)
jurisdictional issue announced in Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971
F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992). Under that test, if the copyright infringement claim is
"incidental" to the breach of contract claim, the copyright claim does not "arise
under the federal copyright laws" for the purpose of § 1338(a) jurisdiction. Id.
at 932-33. Schoenberg will be discussed more fully later in this article. See
injranotes 146-155 and accompanying text.
" Bassett, 204 F.3d at 346. The approach taken by the court of appeals was one
which it first announced in T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir.
1964). See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text (T.B. Harms analyzed).
The Bassett court also made clear that it was rejecting the test applicable in
Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc. 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992). See
infra notes 150-153 and accompanying text (The Schoenberg "test"). Finally, in
a footnote, the Bassett court stated: "This portion of the opinion has been
circulated among all the active judges of the court, and all have expressed
agreement." Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 n.13. Although decided by a three-judge
panel, the jurisdictional rule announced in Bassett appears to have been
unanimously agreed to by all the judges within the Second Circuit. The process
used in arriving at this consensus is curious to say the least.
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appeals in Bassett.'9 In general, Part III will consider decisions of
lower federal courts and the reasons why some of those courts
focus on whether the copyright claim or issue is one "incidental"
to the breach of contract claim while others focus on whether a
copyright claim or issue appears from the face of the plaintiff's
complaint.2 ° In particular, Part III will analyze the district court
and court of appeals decisions within the Second Circuit. Not only
was this circuit the birthplace of the two jurisdictional approaches,
but it was also one in which the trial and appellate court judges
have disagreed on which approach is preferable to the other.2 '
Following the examination of the approaches which lower
federal courts have taken when resolving the § 1338(a)
copyright/contracts jurisdictional issue, the author will offer his
comments concerning each approach in Part IV of this article.22
The author's conclusions and suggestions for harmonizing the
different approaches will be offered at this time.
Before viewing the approaches in Part Il or offering
commentary and conclusions, the part of this article to follow takes
a historical view of the approaches. In this regard, Part II will
review three decisions of the United States Supreme Court which
were instrumental to the holding of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in TB. Harms v. Eliscu, the leading
§ 1338(a) case in the copyright/contracts jurisdiction area.23 Part
24
II will conclude with an analysis of the Eliscu opinion.
19 The two approaches have each emanated from the rule in TB. Harms

applicable to a complaint which not only states a copyright infringement claim
or raises a copyright issue but also arises from or "in the context of a breach of
See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
contract."
20
See generally Baptiste v. Khoury, 910 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. La. 1996). See
notes 83-118 and accompanying text.
infra
21
See generally Felix Cinematografica v. Penthouse Int'l, 671 F. Supp. 313
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc. v. Time-Life Films, Inc., 736 F.
Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See infra notes 119-186 and accompanying text.
22 See generally Baptiste v. Khoury, 910 F. Supp. 277, 278 (W.D. La. 1996). See
also infra notes 197-203 and accompanying text.
23 See generally Wilson v. Sandford, 51 U.S. 99 (1850). See also infra notes 2568 and accompanying text.
See generally T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1968). See also
infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.

24
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II. BACKGROUND

A. The Patent/ContractSubject MatterJurisdictionalIssue:
Wilson v. Sandford, New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine
Co., American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co.
Three opinions of the United States Supreme Court have laid the
foundation for the approaches that federal courts today take when
analyzing the copyright/contract jurisdictional issue. On the merits
all three concerned the relationship between "arising under"
jurisdiction as provided for by statute and a United States Patent
Statute. In the first, Wilson v. Sandford, the plaintiff held a
United States patent. 26 In Wilson, the defendants acquired the
authority to use the patented machine through a license.27 The
consideration for the license was, in part, paid in cash with the
balance secured by notes to be paid over a fixed time period.28
The license contained the following provision: "And if said notes,
...be not punctually paid.., then all and singular rights hereby
granted shall revert to the [patentee], who shall be reinvested
in the
29
made."
been
not
had
license
this
if
as
manner
same
Following the defendants' default in paying the notes, plaintifflicensor brought an action in a District of Louisiana Court. 30 The
object of the suit was to set aside the license and to secure an
25 It is not unusual for decisions reached by the United States Supreme Court in
patent/contract jurisdiction cases to form the basis for cases concerning

copyright/contracts jurisdictional issues. The United States Constitution at

Article 1,Section 8, Clause 8 grants to Congress the authority to enact both
patent and copyright legislation when it provides, in pertinent part: "the

Congress shall have the Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 8. At present a single jurisdiction statute applies to both patents and
copyrights. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1993 & Supp. 2001).
26 Wilson, 51 U.S. at 99.
27 id.
18 Id.at 99-100.
29
1Id. at 100.
30 id.
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injunction prohibiting defendants from further using the machine
on the ground that "it was an infringement of... patent rights.'
On the issue of whether the federal court had jurisdiction to hear
plaintiffs appeal from the dismissal of the suit, the interpretation
to be given to the last clause of the 17th section of the
jurisdictional statute was critical. That clause granted jurisdiction
to the United States Supreme Court in "all actions, suits,
controversies on cases arisingunder any law of the United States,
granting or confirming to inventors the exclusive right in their
inventions or discoveries. ' 32 When the Wilson Court applied this
language to the facts before it, the Court found that the case did
not arise under any act of Congress. 33 Rather, the Court reasoned
that the plaintiffs complaint sought to set aside a contract and
requested a forfeiture of defendants' rights under it.34 According
to the Court, the injunction that was sought followed from the
forfeiture of defendants' rights under the contract.3 5 Neither the
plaintiffs action nor the remedy sought, therefore, depended upon
the parties' patent rights. 36 As
a result, the Court dismissed the
37
appeal for lack ofjurisdiction.
From Wilson, it follows that an action, such as a patent act, does
not arise under an act of Congress if the action is solely one based
Wilson, 51 U.S. at 101.
Id. (emphasis added). The statute at issue in Wilson is comparable to the
statute under consideration in this article. For the United States Supreme Court
31

32

to have jurisdiction in Wilson the "arising under" language was a pivotal feature
of the 1836 statute just as is the comparable language in § 1338(a) in the present
statute. In addition, the 1836 statute was directed to a specific class of cases:

"patent" cases. Similarly, § 1338(a) is directed to a specific class of cases, most
notably "copyright and patent" actions. See supranote 3 and accompanying
text. Finally, it is worth noting that the Wilson court concluded that jurisdiction
was given to the class of cases by the 1836 statute in order "to secure uniformity
of decision in the construction of the act of Congress in relation to patents." Id.
(emphasis added). That purpose also appears fulfilled by the present

jurisdictional statute not only as to patents but also to copyrights as well.
33

rd.

34.!d.

35

id.

36

Wilson, 51 U.S. at 101.
Id.

37
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on state common law or equitable principles. The second decision
in this Supreme Court trilogy affimed Wilson. In addition, the
decision suggested the grounds on which a plaintiffs complaint
may be found to arise under an act of Congress such as a patent act
or a copyright act.
In New MarshallEngine Co. v. MarshallEngine Co., the United
States Supreme Court was again confronted with a jurisdictional
issue within the patent context. 38 More particularly, the question
of whether the federal courts alone had jurisdiction to hear the case
39
arose during a suit brought before a state court in Massachusetts.
In that action, the plaintiff sought specific performance to compel
defendant to assign to plaintiff an improvement on a patent. 40 The
plaintiff would be entitled to that remedy, if the improvement at
issue were included under the terms of a contract. 4 1 Defendants
moved to dismiss the action because: "'it presents questions
involving an inquiry as to the construction and scope of the patents
questions the Federal courts have
therein mentioned, of which
42
jurisdiction."
exclusive
The issue in Marshall came before the United States Supreme
Court on writ of error from the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
43
The Marshallcourt first recognized that in viewing the
Court.
exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts over patents it was
necessary to make a distinction. 44 Distinguished from those cases
which arise under the patent laws are those "in which the patent
' 45 According to the
may be the subject matter of the controversy. A
38 New Marshall Engine Co. v. Marshall Engine Co., 223 U.S. 473, 475 (1912).
39

id.

40 Id.at 479.
41

Id.The inventor had originally assigned the patent and "all improvements
thereon" to a company that he had organized. Id. at 474. That assignment
contained a clause assuring that the inventor would assign "all improvements."
Id. After this assignment was executed, the inventor executed another
instrument in which he transferred the same patent and "all further
improvements thereon....
42
Id. at 474.
43 New MarshallEngine Co., 223 U.S. at 474.
4id.
4

1Id.at 478.
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Court, the latter class of cases includes title questions and contracts
relating to patents.46 As to47these cases the Court concluded that
state courts had jurisdiction.
The Marshall opinion is instructive for the distinction the Court
drew between a patent case which comes within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the federal courts and a case which does not, i.e.,
the case in which title is at issue or one which raises issues of
contracts alone.4 8 Marshall also suggests that when defendant
asserts that state courts have jurisdiction, the plaintiffs
complaint
49
must show the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction.
When the Marshalldefendants then claimed that the state courts
lacked jurisdiction to enter the specific performance decree
because the plaintiff also sought an injunction against defendants
as a result of patent infringement, the United States Supreme Court
considered the allegations of plaintiffs complaint.5 0
Upon
examination, the Court found that absent from the complaint were
allegations involving "any construction of the meaning or effect of
patent," or, allegations that the actions of "defendants would be
infringement of the patent." 51 As to the injunction which the
plaintiff sought, the complaint did not allege appropriate grounds
other than a contract or title basis.52 The injunction, therefore,
was
53
not a remedy sought as a result of patent infringement.
The last of the three decisions of the United States Supreme
Court which form the foundation for the approaches followed by
federal courts presently when adjudging the § 1338(a) issue is
46

rd.

47Im.

48
New MarshallEngine Co.,
49

Id.at 479.

223 U.S. at 478.

so Id
51

rd. at 479-80.

52 Id.

As the court explained, the allegations in plaintiff's complaint were to be
considered seeking to "enforce the specific execution of the contract referred to
and not.., to protect ...the exclusive enjoyment of the patent right." Id. at

480.

53New MarshallEngine Co.,

223 U.S. at 480. As the Court stated, "[t]he
injunction was asked for only as an incident of a finding that the title was vested
in the plaintiff."
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American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. 5 4 In this case, as
with the two earlier cases, the Supreme Court was asked to
determine if the plaintiffs claim was resting within the exclusive
of the federal courts because it arose under the patent
jurisdiction
55
laws.
As to the plaintiff s complaint, it alleged that the plaintiff owned
a certain pump which defendants "falsely and maliciously libeled
and slandered... by stating that the pump and certain parts thereof
,,.
6 The
are infringements upon the defendant's pump .
plaintiffs complaint further alleged that the defendants sued some
users of plaintiffs pump and have threatened suits against others
claiming that the users of plaintiffs pump infringed upon
defendants' patent.57
When American Well Works was considered by the United
States Supreme Court, the Court stated the rule that "[a] suit arises
'
In applying this
under the law that creates the cause of action."58
rule to the plaintiffs suit, the court reasoned that plaintiffs suit
was one for damages to its business which resulted from
defendants' suits and threatened suits under the patent. 9
Defendants' suits and threats were the acts that injured plaintiffs
business. 60 According to the Court's majority, defendant's actions
61
were "wrongs" because they caused plaintiff a business injury.
Further reaching this result depended "upon the law of the State
where the act is done, not upon the patent law .... 62
"[T]herefore the suit ar[ose] under the law of the State" to the
54 Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
55

Id.at 258. Plaintiff in this case brought the action against defendant in a state
court. Following its removal, the plaintiff motion to remand was dismissed.
The district court held that because "the cause of action arose under the patent
laws of the United States," the state court had no jurisdiction, and therefore
neither
did the court where the case was removed.
56

id.

17 Id.at
58
59

259

Id.at 260.
Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260.
id.

60 Am.

61 rd.
62

id.
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exclusion of the patent laws. 63 As such, the United64States District
Court lacked exclusive jurisdiction to hear the case.
63

Id.In reaching this conclusion, the Court made it clear that important to the

outcome of the jurisdictional issue are those circumstances which make up the
plaintiff's case versus those which defendant may raise in justification or
defense. Id. at 259. As to the latter, they are not a part of plaintiff s case.
The Court also made it clear that when plaintiff claimed defendant damaged its
business, it did not matter if that business was built upon patents or not. In
proving the damage, foreign to the proof would be evidence of plaintiff s own
patents.
Also, the court was of the opinion that "anything concerning the defendants'
patent" was not part of plaintiffs case. In the words of the Court: "The fact
that the justification may involve the validity and infringement of a patent is no
more material to the question under what law the suit is brought than it would be
in an action of contract." Id. at 260.
It may be important to distinguish between the "arising under" jurisdiction
specific to a patent case such as American Well Works from a general grant of
statutory original jurisdiction to United States district courts which is found
todayin 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993 & Supp. 2001). Inthis
regard the Supreme Court, in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S.
180 (1921), concluded that the district court's jurisdiction was not solely
dependent upon whether the plaintiffs cause of action arose under federal law
or state law. Rather, the Court adopted a principle more inclusive than the
"cause of action" test.
Under the Smith principle, the district courts have jurisdiction "where it appears
from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to relief depends upon the
construction or application of the Constitution or laws of the United States, and
that such federal claim is not merely colorable, and rests upon a reasonable
foundation.... ." Id. at 199. As made clear by Justice Holmes dissenting in
Smith, the Court's principle when applied would allow the district court to
secure jurisdiction in a case where the cause of action did not arise under any
law of the United States but wholly under state law. Id. at 214. For example, if
state law imposed a duty on a defendant and state law authorized that duty to be
determined under the United States Constitution or an Act of Congress, the
Smith principle would apply and the district court would have jurisdiction to
hear the plaintiff's claim. This result follows even though "[t]he whole
foundation of the duty is [state] law, which at its sole will incorporate the
[United States] law as it might incorporate a document." Id. According to
Justice Holmes, when the relevance and effect of United States law depends
"not on its own force but upon the law that took it up," the United States district
courts should not have jurisdiction because the "cause of action arises wholly
from the law of the [s]tate." Id.
64 Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260. The Supreme Court reversed the lower
federal court's judgment dismissing the suit for want ofjurisdiction. Id. This
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Collectively, Wilson, Marshall, and American Well Works
establish that for a suit to arise under the patent laws of the United
States sufficiently to enable a United States district court to
exercise exclusive statutory jurisdiction, the plaintiff must show
the following: 1) that the action is one which is not based solely
upon state common law or equitable principles;6 5 2) that the
United States patent law is more than merely the subject of the
controversy, i.e., title to a patent or patent contract is not solely at
issue; 66 3) that the remedy sought is one resulting from a duty
imposed by the patent law; 67 and, 4) that the patent law "creates
the cause of action" underlying the suit.68 Although these criteria
have not been considered by the United States Supreme Court, to
date when the suit concerns both a United States Copyright Act
and the contract law of a state, one decision of the United States
to follow. This
Court of Appeals is recognized as the "paradigm"
69
Eliscu.
v.
Co.
is the case of T. B. Harms
B. The "Paradigm"Analyzed. T. B. Harms v. Eliscu
In TB. Harms, plaintiff, T.B. Harms Company, brought an
action against defendant, Edward Eliscu, in a United States district
court. 70 Plaintiff sought declaratory and equitable relief.7 1 On the
judgment was based on the ground that the state court from which the case had
been removed was without jurisdiction. Id. at 258. From the Court's analysis
and the conclusion it reached on the facts, the state court did have jurisdiction
and so reversal appeared the proper disposition of the appeal. Presumably, there
were further proceedings before the district court in this case in which a motion
to remand to the state court would be granted on the ground that this court had
the jurisdiction which the district court lacked.
Mr. Justice McKenna wrote a cursory dissent. In his opinion, "the case involves
a direct and substantial controversy under the patent laws." Id. at 260.
65 Wilson, 51 U.S. at 101. See also supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
6 New MarshallEngine, 223 U.S. at 479. See also supranotes 45-47 and
text.
accompanying
67
Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260. See also supranote 58 and accompanying
text.
68
Id. See also supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
69 339 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1968).
70

id.
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substance, T.B. Harms claimed that under a contract between it
and Eliscu, Harms acquired ownership of renewal copyrights in
songs Eliscu co-authored.72 Eliscu denied that he had transferred
ownership to Harms by contract.73
Upon Eliscu's motion, the district court dismissed T.B. Harms'
complaint holding that the court did not have jurisdiction of the
subject matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). 74 In reaching this
conclusion, the court reasoned that it lacked jurisdiction because
Harms' complaint
did not allege "any act or threat of copyright
75
infringement."
On plaintiffs appeal to the Second Circuit, the court of appeals
agreed with the district court that the complaint did not allege a
copyright infringement. 76 The court of appeals, however, was of
the opinion that "the jurisdictional statute does not speak in terms
of infringement, and the undoubted truth that a claim for
the Copyright Act does not establish
infringement 'arises under'
77
that nothing else can."
As to those circumstances that may otherwise give rise to federal
jurisdiction under § 1338(a), the TB. Harms court, in general,
concluded that there were three: 1) an action seeking a remedy
provided by the Copyright Act other than infingement; 78 2) an
action "requiring construction" of the Copyright Act; 79 and, 3) an
71

Id.at 825.

72id.
73 Id. at

824.

74 TB. Harms Co., 339 F.2d at 825.
75 id.
76 id.
77 Id. The court of appeals in TB. Harms, nevertheless,

affirmed the district
court. History and "good sense" lead it to the conclusion "that an action to
determine who owns a copyright does not arise under the Copyright Act, which
creates the federal copyright with an implied right to license and an explicit
right
78 Id. to assign."
at 828. The court gave the example of an action for "statutory royalties for
record reproduction." Id. Under the present Copyright Act that remedy is
provided for in section 115 albeit by implication. See 17 U.S.C. § 115(C)(1996
& Supp. 2001).
79 TB. Harms,339 F.2d at 825. According to the court, in such an action the

complaint must reveal that the "suit requires an interpretation of the Copyright
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action "where a distinctive policy of the Act requires that federal
principles control the disposition of the claim." 80
In TB. Harms, the court of appeals set limits to the proper
exercise of subject matter jurisdiction under § 1338(a).81 As the
next section of this article indicates, federal courts since TB.
Harms have differed in their approaches to applying those limits.
In particular, one question repeatedly arises within the case law
since TB. Harms: when does the action contain a claim or raise an
to come within the scope
issue under the Copyright Act sufficient
82
ofjurisdiction?
of § 1338(a)'s grant

Act." Illustrative of the application of this principle, albeit in a non-judicial
jurisdictional context, is De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570 (1956). In that
case, the issue arose whether an illegitimate child was within the term
"children" created by the 1909 Copyright Act, and whether they were entitled to
share in a renewal copyright. Id. at 571-72.
In addressing this issue the United States Supreme Court recognized that
although the issue of who children are under the Copyright Act gives rise to a
federal question, that question may "be determined by state rather than federal
law." Id. at 580. The Court added that "[t]his is especially true where a statute
deals with a familiar relationship; there is no federal law of domestic relations,
which is primarily a matter of state concern." Id. Thereafter, the De Sylva
Court concluded that the Copyright Act's term "children" was to be defined
under state law. Id.
Although state law may be controlling in defining the term "children," the suit
brought by a child claiming a copyright interest under the Act of Congress as
required an interpretation of the Act. As such, a district court under Eliscu
would have jurisdiction to hear the suit.
'0TB. Harms Co., 339 F.2d at 828. Here, the court did not make clear when
"federal common law" would apply to what otherwise would be a "state law"
case. The court indicated, however, that it may be better for the federal court to
base its jurisdiction "on 28 U.S.C.§ 1331 rather than on § 1338." Id.
81
82

Id.
See infra, notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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III. ANALYSIS

A. The Approaches to Applying the TB. HarmsLimits

1. In General

a. The "Essenceof the Dispute" Approach
Lower federal courts have recognized that T.B.Harms Co. is the
leading case interpreting § 1338(a) "in actions pertaining to both
state law of contracts and federal copyright law." 83 When a
plaintiffs complaint alleges a claim which raises both state
contract issues and issues of copyright infringement, the courts,
however, have reached contradictory results on the issue of their
jurisdiction.84 In this regard, some federal courts have concluded
that a complaint which states a cause of action for copyright
infringement and seeks remedies under the Copyright Act, may
nevertheless not be within the jurisdiction of the federal courts
under § 1338(a).85 This is because the action is not the "essence of
the dispute" between plaintiff and defendant. The case of Baptiste
v. Khoury illustrates the application of the "essence of the dispute"
approach.86
In Baptiste, the plaintiff claimed to have authored and registered
a claim of copyright in a song.5 7 In addition, he claimed that in a
contract assigning his rights in the song to a music publishing
83 Baptiste

v. Khoury, 910 F. Supp. 277, 278 (W.D. La. 1996). See also Joseph
J. Legat Architects, P.C. v. U.S. Dev. Corp., 601 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. IlM. 1985);
TGI Friday's, Inc. v. Nat'l Rests. Mgmt., Inc., 1992 WL 164445 (S.D.N.Y. Jun.
24, 1992); Peay v. Morton, 571 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Tenn. 1983); Stipelcovich v.
Inc., 129 F. Supp.2d 989 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
DIRECTV,
84
1d. at 279 (citing Amy B. Cohen, Arising UnderJurisdictionand the
Copyright Laws, 44 HAsTINGS L.J. 337, 362-63 (1993)).
85
86 See, e.g., Baptiste, 910 F. Supp. at 277.

Baptiste, 910 F. Supp. at 277.

87 id.
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company, the defendant's name was added as co-author,
88
surreptitiously, and without the plaintiffs consent or knowledge.
Based on those claims, the plaintiff brought an action for damages,
accounting, and an injunction against the defendant.8 9
Following the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a), the District Court for the
Western District of Louisiana concerning the jurisdictional issue
stated: "Whether or not jurisdiction over an action 'has been
conferred on the federal courts by Congress must be determined
from its nature and foundation and does not depend on the remote
possibility that during its future course some question under the
copyright laws may incidentally arise. 90 For the court then, it
was only when the infringement issue commanded a "separate and
substantial inquiry" that it had jurisdiction. 91 On the other hand, if
the copyright question was resolved by the answer to the state law
matter, or was "merely
incidental" to that question, the court
92
jurisdiction.
lacked
When the district court applied its "separate and substantial" or
"merely incidental" approach to the facts, it found that the "state
contract fraud issue [was] principal and controlling in [the]
case." 93 The courts reasoning on the facts is illuminating. If, as
alleged, the defendant fraudulently added his name to the contract,
the plaintiff would be entitled to damages and royalties as matter
of state law. 94 On the other hand, even if the defendant was the
co-author and signed the contract with the plaintiffs consent,
95
royalties under the contract would still be a matter of state law.
In either case, the Copyright Act is foreign to the issues in the
"
8 Id. at 278.

9Id. In addition, plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from collecting royalties

and claiming co-authorship of the song, "Sea of Love." He also sought recovery
of
90 all royalties paid to defendant as purported co-author of that song.
Id. at 279 (emphasis added) (quoting Cresci v. Music Publishers Holding
Corp.
210 F. Supp. 253, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)).
91
Baptiste,910 F. Supp. at 277.
92
Id.
93id.
94 id.
95

Id.
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96

case.
A second case illustrating the application of the "essence of the
dispute" approach to answering the § 1338(a) jurisdictional
problem is worth examining. In Royal v. Leading Edge Products,
Inc., the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant, his
employer, under which the plaintiff was to create software for the
defendant in exchange for royalties. 97 Following the plaintiffs
plaintiffs
creation of the software, the defendant terminated the
98
royalties.
him
pay
to
employment, and failed thereafter
In the action against the defendant filed in district court, the
plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that it was the "co-owner
of the copyright in the software" as well as an accounting from the
date the plaintiff was terminated from employment. 99 Plaintiff
invoked the court's jurisdiction under § 1338(a), asserting that its
claim was "rooted in federal copyright law." 100 Specifically, the
plaintiff argued that its claim implicated the "work-made-for-hire
doctrine," codified in the Copyright Act. 101 In this regard, the
plaintiff contended that the defendant was not an employer-author
under the statute and therefore sole owner of the copyright because
the statutory declaration of copyright ownership was altered by the
96 Baptiste, 910

F. Supp. at 277. The result in the case would, in all likelihood,
have been the same had the court not sought to divide the "principal and
controlling issues" in the case. It appears from the opinion that plaintiff s
complaint did not allege copyright infringement, nor did the plaintiff seek
remedies under the Copyright Act. In addition, the construction of the Act was

not called into question nor was a policy of the Copyright Act at stake. See T.B.
Harms Co., 339 F.2d at 828.

Royal v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 833 F.2d 1 ( 1st Cir. 1987). According to
the court of appeals the software, when completed, was an original work of
authorship and so the subject matter of copyright under the United States
Copyright Act. Id. at 2.
97

98

d.
Id.at2.
'o Id. at 2. Initially, the court responded to plaintiff s assertion by stating: "But,
that is a ketchup bottle of an argument: it looks full at first glance, but it is
surpassingly difficult to get anything out of it."
Id.at 3. The Copyright Act, in pertinent part, provides: A "work for hire" is
'o'
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment.
... 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1993 & Supp. 2001).

99
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royalty agreement. 12 Under the plaintiffs proffered construction
of both the Copyright Act's "work-for-hire" provision and the
royalty agreement with the defendant, plaintiff was
a co-owner
10 3
with the defendant of the copyright in the software.
In its response to this argument, the court of appeals concluded
that the Copyright Act was only "tangentially implicated" in
plaintiff s complaint. 0 4 First, should the royalty agreement stand,
"plaintiff's sole remedy for the breach of [the agreement] would be
10 5
money damages-and the Copyright Act need not be construed."'
Second, if the agreement was rescinded as a result of defendant's
breach, the defendant, as employer under the Copyright Act,
would be the statutory author and sole owner of the copyright in
the software. 10 6 In either case, the court thought the plaintiff was
in a "no-win" situation, in other
words, it had no ownership rights
10 7
based on the Copyright Act.
In addition to the court of appeals' response to this argument,
the court saw the "crowning blow" to the jurisdiction issue in its
"generic obligation" to "'decide whether a case arises under the
copyright laws by focusing on the nature of the principal claim
asserted by plaintiff."",10 8 As such, when it examined the
plaintiff's principle claim, the court of appeals found its "essence"
was "one for breach of contract."' 10 9 According to the court, the
plaintiffs case depended on the following: 1) "Whether or not
102

Royal, 833 F.2d at 3.

103

Id. It appears that in its request for declaratory relief, the plaintiff was asking
the court to interpret the language of both the "work-for-hire" provision in the
Copyright Act and also sought the court to construe the royalty agreement of
the parties.
'04 1d. at4.

105Id.

...
Id. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) which provides: In the case of a work made for
hire, the employer or other person from whom the work was prepared is
considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of
the rights comprised in the copyright. 17 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1993 & Supp. 2001).
107 Royal, 833 F.2d at 4.
log Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (quoting Topolos v. Caldewey, 698 F.2d 991, 993

(9th Cir. 1983)).
109 Id.
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there had been compliance with the terms of the royalty
agreement" and, if defendant had not complied; 2) "What should
be the effect of that noncompliance as a contractual matter."' 10 As
to plaintiffs position that the claim implicated the copyright laws,
that the plaintiff had asserted "no colorable claim
the court 1found
11
right."'
of
Both the Baptiste and Royal cases illustrate that some federal
courts will take jurisdiction of a contracts/copyright dispute under
§ 1338(a) only after considering whether the copyright issues may
be characterized as "separate and substantial" or whether the
"essence" of the plaintiffs claim is or is not one for breach of
contract. Not all federal courts, however, have read TB. Harms as
calling for such an approach to the § 1338(a) issue. Illustrative of
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Vestron, Inc. v. Home
this fact is11the
2
Box Office.
b. The Face of the Complaint Rule: Vestron v. Home Box Office
In Vestron, the plaintiffs complaint alleged ownership of the
exclusive rights to reproduce and distribute two motion pictures in
the form of videocassettes. 113 The plaintiffs complaint also
alleged that the defendant's acts constituted 114copyright
infingement and sought relief under the Copyright Act.
With these allegations before it, the court of appeals had little
difficulty in concluding that it had jurisdiction. In this regard, the
court applied the "well pleaded complaint rule." 115 Under the rule,
whether the plaintiffs case arose under the Copyright Act for
purposes of determining the court's jurisdiction was decided when
the court found that plaintiffs complaint stated a "bona fide
110
1d.
1 Id. Since the subject matter of the royalty agreement was copyrightable
material, perhaps it, not the remediation for breach which plaintiff sought, was
the "essence" of the dispute. The Royal court, of course, by implication at least,
to follow such reasoning.
refused
112
Vestron, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 839 F.2d 1380 (9th Cir 1988).
1
1

3 Id.
114Id.

at 13 82.

115.Id.
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'1 16

infingement claim."
After concluding that its jurisdiction was founded properly on
the plaintiffs complaint, the Vestron court also made it clear that
"contested contract" issues to be decided as a matter of state law
would not undo that jurisdiction. 17 Indeed the court indicated that
should "affidavits or other materials reveal the infringement claim
to be spurious, . . . the proper avenue is 118
dismissal for failure to
state a claim under federal copyright law."
With Vestron, and the "face of the complaint" approach to §
1338(a), the second of the two jurisdictional approaches which, in
general, federal courts follow, has been examined. This approach,
as well as the "essence of the dispute," have been the subjects of
considerable debate in the Second Circuit. This article will next
examine the case law within that circuit.
2. In Particular-TheExperience of the Courts within the Second
Circuit

a. The Southern Districtof New York
Although the TB. Harms opinion was authored by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the subsequent
history of that decision reflects division within that circuit when
applying the case law. Illustrative of this point are two district
court
opinions:
Felix Cinematografica v.
Penthouse
119
International
and Daniel Wilson Productions,Inc. v. Time-Life
120
Films, Inc.
16 Id.at

1381. In addition the court made it clear that jurisdiction is not

defeated by defendant's assertion of defenses or plaintiff's anticipation of those
defenses in the complaint.
117Vestron, Inc., 839 F.2d at 1381. Contract issues such as those of copyright
ownership would not undermine the court's jurisdiction.
" 8 Id. at 1382. By implication the court must have jurisdiction under the wellpleaded complaint approach to dismiss the infringement claim on the merits.
19Felix Cinematografica v. Penthouse Int'l, 671 F. Supp. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
120 Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc. v. Time-Life Films, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 40

(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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In Felix, the plaintiff alleged in its complaint that it owned a
copyright in a motion picture which the defendants infringed "by
distributing videocassettes of the film.' ' 121 In addition, the plaintiff
sought an injunction and damages.' 22 The Felix defendants denied
that the plaintiff owned the copyright.1 23 They also asserted that
owners of the movie under an agreement
they were the copyright
24
plaintiff.'
with the
When the district court considered whether it had jurisdiction
under § 1338(a), it found that the plaintiffs complaint was
"framed entirely in terms of infiingement."' 125 Nevertheless, the
court concluded that § 1338(a) did not grant it the power to hear
the claim because the "essence" of the action was one in contract.
The plaintiff sought a declaration that the agreement with the
defendants "did not transfer the rights of videocassette distribution
to the defendants.' 26
For the Felix court, whether it had jurisdiction depended on its
interpretation or characterization of the "essence" of the action
rather than whether the complaint stated a claim under the
27
Copyright Act and sought remedies provided for in that Act.'
The court may dismiss the claim on jurisdictional grounds when
response discloses that "it was in reality a contract
the defendant's
, ' 28
claim.
12 1 Felix Cinematografica,671

F. Supp. at 314.
Id. at 314. The injunction, if granted, would have prohibited the defendants
from
123 distributing videocassettes of the motion picture.
122

1-d.

124 id.
1

2Id. at 315.

126

Felix Cinematografica,671 F. Supp. at 315. In adopting this line of

reasoning the court relied on two earlier opinions in the Southern District of
New York. See Elan Assocs. Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music Ltd., 339 F. Supp.
461 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (case does not arise under the copyright law if the
"principle and controlling issue" concerns a matter of state law); Berger v.
Simon & Schuster, 631 F. Supp. 915, (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (action dismissed when

resolution of common law contract issues leaves the court with no issues of
law to decide).
copyright
12 7 See Felix Cinematografica,671 F. Supp. at 313.
128Id.

Because the court dismissed the suit on jurisdictional grounds, it did not
adjudicate the issue of whether the plaintiff had a legitimate claim against the
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Not all judges sitting within the Southern District of New York
have agreed with the line of cases holding that the "essence" of the
controversy test is the one to be used to determine subject matter
jurisdiction. In Daniel Wilson Productions,Inc. v. Time-Life, Inc.,
for example,
the plaintiffs complaint alleged three causes of
1 29
action.
First, the plaintiff claimed to be the copyright owner of two
films and further alleged that, although it had licensed certain
ownership rights to the defendant, Time-Life, it did not license
home videocassette rights. 130 In its complaint, the plaintiff also
alleged that the defendant purported to license those home
videocassette rights to other defendants who distributed and sold
home videocassettes.13 1 Finally, as to the first cause of action,
plaintiff alleged that because it, and not Time-Life, owned the
defendant. By concluding, however, that it did not have jurisdiction under §
1338(a) to hear a suit arising under the copyright laws of the United States has
not the court, however, by implication concluded that whatever the plaintiff
claim is, it cannot be an infringement claim under the copyright laws of the
United States in which both the statutory remedies of an injunction and of
damages are available to the plaintiff? See 17 U.S.C. §§ 501-02 (1996 & Supp.
2001). For example, in Felix the district court, although dismissing the
plaintiff's copyright claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction stated:
'Tlaintiff may have a legitimate claim, albeit one which must be brought in
another forum." Felix Cinematografica,671 F. Supp. at 315. The "other
forum" of which the court wrote must, of necessity, be a state forum. In turn,
since § 133 8(a) vests jurisdiction over suits arising under the copyright laws
exclusively in United States District Courts, the legitimate claim of which the
court wrote must be a state law claim. The question has been raised, therefore,
of whether the "essence" rule applied in Felix and similar cases at once purports
not to adjudicate the plaintiff s copyright suit and copyright remedies, yet has
the effect of precluding the plaintiff from having that claim adjudicated by
taking away the federal forum. Should a rule be tolerated which reaches such a
result? See infra note 118 and accompanying text (The rule should not be
tolerated).
129Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc., 736 F. Supp at 41.
0
13
Id.at 40. From these allegations, it appears clear that the plaintiff s action
involves a contract with the defendant, Time-Life. Under that agreement,
plaintiff, as the copyright owner, allegedly granted certain rights it owned under
the Copyright Act to this defendant, but reserved other rights such as the
distribution
of videocassettes for home viewing.
3
1

id.
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home videocassette rights, Time-Life could not transfer them to
the other defendants. 132 Therefore, by distributing and selling the
videos for home 133
use, the defendants violated plaintiffs rights as
copyright owner.
The plaintiffs third cause of action was for breach of contract
against Time-Life. 13 4 Here, the plaintiff alleged that Time-Life
failed to discharge its obligations under the license, which was
involved in the first cause of action pleaded. 35 In regard to that
cause of action, the plaintiff sought the remedies of injunction,
impoundment of the infringing videocassettes, accounting, and
damages.' 36 In addition, plaintiff sought costs and attorney fees. 3 7
As to plaintiffs38third cause of action, it sought damages of one
million dollars.1
In response to plaintiffs first cause of action, the defendants
contended that it was in essence a contracts claim which raised
state law issues with respect to the "interpretation of . . . and
performance" of a license between plaintiff and defendant, Time-

132

id.

133 Id.

Under the present copyright act, among the rights which the act grants to
copyright owners is the right "to distribute copies... of the copyrighted work to
the public by sale...." 17 U.S.C. § 106(3)(1996 & Supp. 2001).
Plaintiffs second cause of action differed from the first in that it claimed a
copyright infringement of the second of the two films at issue in the case. The
allegations concerning plaintiff s copyright ownership, its contractual
relationship with Time-Life, and the conduct of other defendants in the case
were in other respects the same. Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc., 736 F. Supp. at 41.
134 Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc., 736 F. Supp at
41.
135
Id. In particular, plaintiff alleged that defendant Time-Life's efforts at
marketing the two films that were part of the license was inadequate and that
plaintiff had received far less revenue than contemplated by the agreement.
136 Id.
137

Id. Each of the remedies which plaintiff sought is provided for by the
Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. §§ 502-05 (1996 & Supp. 2001). It appears that
because the plaintiff's first cause of action was one it alleged to arise under
Copyright Act that the remedies sought were also alleged to be available under
that act.
138 Daniel Wilson Prods.,Inc., 736 F. Supp. at 40. Since the third cause
of
action was an allegation of breach of contract, the remedy sought appears to be
available as a matter of state law only.
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Life. 139 Near the outset of its analysis of the allegations within
plaintiffs complaint and defendants' response, the Daniel court
recognized that the case was analogous to a "number of decisions
over the years" raising the question of whether the case arose
under federal jurisdictional statutes applicable to the copyright
laws or was merely a contract action under state law. 140 In those
decisions, such as the Felix case, the District Court for the
141
Southern District of New York applied the "essence test."
The Daniel court, however, rejected the Felix court approach.
After doing so the court stated:
Where a complaint alleges a federally conferred
right, such as a copyright.. .then alleges violations
of that right and requests remedies provided by
federal statute, this should be enough to confer
federal jurisdiction. The fact that such a claim
arises in the context of a disruption of contractual
arrangements and presents certain contract issues
should not remove it from that jurisdiction. 142
Before reaching these conclusions, the court was persuaded that
the "essence test" should be rejected because requiring the court to
decide what is "fundamental" to or at the "heart" of a controversy
creates "undue uncertainty and complication.., in administering a
test of federal jurisdiction ....143
19 Id.at 41. Defendant's response was identical with respect to plaintiffs
second cause of action. As to plaintiffs third cause of action, defendants raised
the jurisdictional issue once again. It appears that this cause of action was
admittedly one under state law since plaintiff sought to invoke the pendent
jurisdiction of the district court.
140 Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc., 736 F. Supp at 41.
14 1
Felix Cinematografica,671 F. Supp. at 314. See also supranotes 121-128

and accompanying text.
' 42 Id.at 43.
143
Id. at 43. In reaching these conclusions the court relied heavily on a
trademark case decided in the Southern District of New York. Foxrun
Workshop, Ltd. v. Klone Mfg., Inc., 686 F.Supp. 86 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). In an
opinion written by Judge Leval, the court believed that the jurisdictional issue
should turn on the allegations of the plaintiff s complaint rather than to decide if
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When the court applied its jurisdictional approach to the facts in
Daniel, the court found that "causes of action were properly
pleaded under the federal copyright law." 144 Having concluded
that the actions under the copyright law were sufficiently pleaded,
the court held: "even though certain questions of contract
interpretation are presented, nevertheless the ... causes of action
plead claims for copyright infringement arising under the
Copyright Act within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a).' 45
b. The UnitedStates Courtof Appeals for the Second Circuit
Not only have the district court judges within the Second Circuit
differed in the approaches taken to answering the § 1338(a)
jurisdictional issue, but also the appellate judges of the Second
Circuit have done so as well. What follows is an examination of
the opposing views taken by the courts' members.
Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers Inc. illustrates one
approach that the Second Circuit judges have taken when
considering whether the action comes within the scope of the
the case is primarily one of breach of contract. Id. at 90. Judge Leval also
indicated that although the controversy may focus on the contract issue, the
complaint, under the federal statute, will probably raise issues of federal
statutory interpretation, for example, questions regarding possible remedies
available.
In addition, the Danielcourt quoted with approval the position taken in the
Nimmer treatise on this issue: "'Notwithstanding the existence of a contractual
relationship between the parties, if the defendant's conduct is alleged to be
without authority under such contract and to further constitute an act of statutory
copyright infringement, then federal jurisdiction will be invoked."' Daniel
Wilson Prods., Inc., 736 F. Supp at 43 (citing 3 NiMMERON COPYRIGHT, §
12.01 [A] at 12-8 (1989)).
1445 Daniel Wilson Prods., Inc., 736 F. Supp at 43.
14 Id. It is important to note that on the face of the plaintiff's complaint
appeared not only the allegations of copyright ownership and infringement, but
also allegations that certain exclusive rights of the copyright owner-plaintiff
were transferred to defendant, Time-Life, while others were retained by
plaintiff. Id. The former allegations arise under the copyright law and so may
sustain federal court jurisdiction. The latter allegations may raise issues of
contract, of rights transferred or reserved, and therefore questions the state law.
As to these, federal jurisdiction is not supported by § 1338(a).
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court's § 1338 jurisdiction because it seeks a remedy provided by
the Copyright Act. 146 In Schoenberg, plaintiff, the owner of a
copyright in a literary work, claimed that the defendants, book
publishers, broke their licensing contract with him and thereafter
infringed his copyright "by publishing and offering for sale his
work."' 147 On appeal from a judgment holding him in contempt,
one of the defendant's former attorneys took the position that
because the copyright infringement action was a contracts claim
"disguised" as one of infringement, the court lacked jurisdiction
over that dispute, and as a result, erred in holding him in
contempt.148
When it considered the .appellant's argument, the court of
appeals expressed the jurisdictional issue as "whether a claim
asserting infringement as a result of a breach of contract... arises
under the Copyright Act.' ' 149 The Schoenberg court required
In addition, the
courts to "undertake a three-part test."' 15
Schoenberg court concluded that "in practice," the three parts
would merge into one. 151 The test that emerged in the case was
one that ultimately found the court asking the following: whether a
plaintiffs copyright infringement claim is "incidental" to the
contract claim.'152 If the court finds that the copyright claim is
incidental to the contract claim, subject matter jurisdiction is
lacking under § 1338.53
In addition to announcing the "incidental to" approach to the
jurisdictional issue, the Schoenberg court made it clear that in
resolving the issue a court may "refer to evidence outside of the
pleading . . . ,154 For example, the court may also conduct a
146

Schoenberg v. Shapolsky Publishers, Inc., 971 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1992).

147 Id. at 931.
141 Id. at 930.
49
Id. at 931.
"' Id. at 932. The court indicated that its test was suggested in part by the TB.
Harms case.
151
Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932.

152 Id.

53
'54
Id. at 933.
' Id. Affidavits on the issue of whether the copyright claim is "incidental"

may be considered. Id. In Vestron, Inc., for example, the court indicated that an
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hearing on the jurisdictional issue. As such, a plaintiff s complaint
may plead a claim for breach of contract, but it would not
necessarily preclude a court from finding that the copyright
155
infiingement claim is one not incidental to the contracts claim.
Subsequent to Schoenberg, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit has approached the § 1338 issue
differently.1 56 In Bassett v. MashantucketPequot Tribe, the court
of appeals characterized the Schoenberg approach as
"unworkable." 157 First, the Bassett court reasoned that the person
who is denied "a federal forum on the theory that his copyright
claims are incidental to a contract dispute is thereby denied the
benefit of copyright remedies." 158 Second, the court found that the

affidavit may disclose that the copyright claim is "spurious." Vestron, Inc., 839
F.2d at 1382. As such the claim would be found "incidental" to a contracts
claim. Id. Note, however, the Vestron court in allowing evidence to be
introduced was concerned with the merits of the copyright claim and not on the
grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction. See supra notes 117-118 and
accompanying text.
15 Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 932. According to Schoenberg, when the copyright
infringement stems from a breach of contract a court is to decide if the breach is
to a covenant in or a condition of the agreement. Id. The court would have
jurisdiction when the breach is of a condition of the agreement. Id. If, however,
the breach was of a covenant, jurisdiction would lie only when the breach was
so material that it created a right of rescission. Id. (citing Costello Publishing
Co. v. Rotelle 670 F.2d 1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing 3 NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT,
§ 10.15 [10-108 to 1110](1980))).
15
6Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343 (2d Cir. 2000). The
court described the Schoenberg court's approach to the jurisdictional issue as
dictum and "a digression that had no bearing on the resolution of any issue
decided
by the appeal." Id. at 351 n.6.
57
1 Id. at 352. The court also noted that "[t]he test has been severely criticized
in
the copyright scholarship" (citing 2 William F. Patry, COPYRIGHT LAW AND
PRACTICE 1073 (1994); and Amy B. Cohen, Arising Under Jurisdictionandthe
Copyright Laws, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 337, 364-65, 374 (1993)). Id. at 353 n.8.
..
8 Bassett,209 F.3d at 352. The most important action the Copyright Act
affords the copyright owner against others is infringement. See 17 U.S.C. §
504(a) (1996 & Supp. 2001). Since the federal court is the exclusive forum
before which this action can be adjudicated, a finding that the court lacks
jurisdiction precludes adjudication in any other judicial forum. Accordingly, the
Bassett court was of the opinion that "[s]uch a denial of copyright remedies
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159

Schoenberg test was vague.
Open to question under the facts of each case is whether the
copyright claim is "incidental" to the contracts claim. 60 As a
result some district courts have applied the test in a variety of
ways.' 6 1 For example, one district court has indicated that where
the contracts' remedy adequately remedies the infringement, the
copyright claim is "incidental to" the contracts claim. 162 Another
district court has focused on whether the decision on the copyright
infringement claim is "only a necessary consequence" of the
decision on the contracts claim. 163 Yet a third district court,
concluded that the
although accepting the Schoenberg decision,
1 64
approach is "a task easier said than done."
The Bassett court also recognized that the Schoenberg "test"
was a difficult one to apply for a number of reasons. First, under
the Schoenberg test the plaintiff may not be able to predict whether
the federal court has jurisdiction over the action. 165 In this regard,
the contract between the defendant and the plaintiff may likely be
raised, if at all, by way of a defense to a copyright claim. The
to the
jurisdictional issue of whether that claim is "incidental" 66
defendant.'
the
by
controlled
then
is
claim
contract
of
breach
undermines the Act's capacity to protect copyright interests." Bassett, 209 F.3d
at 352.
159 Bassett, 209 F.3d at 353.
160 The Schoenberg court appeared to recognize this when it suggested that the
test focused on a plaintiffs motives. If the plaintiff is concerned with copyright
infringement, the court has jurisdiction. Id. at 353. If, however, the plaintiff s
concern is with contract claims of the defendant, the court lacks jurisdiction. Id.
It may be asked how Schoenberg would approach the case in which the plaintiff
is6 equally concerned with the copyright and contracts claim.
1 1 d.

162 id.

Living Music Records v. Moss Music Group, 827 F. Supp. 974, 980
(S.D.N.Y. 1993). When the determination of the infringement claim is a
"necessary incident" only, that claim is to be found as "incidental" to the breach
of contracts claim. Id.
164
Athanansius-Design v. Cumberland Homes Ltd., No. 96 C 6764, 1997 WL
176448, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 1997).
165 Bassett, 204 F.3d at 353.
166 Id. It appears that the court in Schoenberg, then, has chosen not to apply the
163

principle that a plaintiff is the "master" of his lawsuit without stating its
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The Bassett court also questioned the soundness of Schoenberg
on a second ground. The court noted that because the plaintiffs
complaint may be grounded in copyright infringement, a federal
court has no reason to question an assertion of jurisdiction under §
1338(a). 167 The face of the complaint, therefore, raises no issue of
whether the copyright infringement claim is incident to a contract
claim. 168 In answer to the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim,
the "defendant, like the plaintiff, may think it desirable to have
As a result, the
them 169 adjudicated in federal court."'170
defendant's answer may not raise the dominance of the contracts
issues at the pleading stage.17 ' At that point, the federal court
cannot even rely on the defendant to raise the "incidental" nature
172
of the copyright issues at the pleading stage of the proceeding.
In raising a third difficulty with Schoenberg,the court of appeals
in Bassett explained that Schoenberg "requires the court to make
complex factual determinations relating to the merits at the outset
of the litigation--before the court has any familiarity with the
case." 173 In turn, these factual determinations, such as the
"plaintiff's principal motives in bringing suit, and what issues will
loom largest in the case, may well require extensive hearings..
reasoning. As a result of its approach, certain plaintiffs, namely, those against
whom no contract defense is raised, will have only the forum available for the
copyright infringement claim. Others, however, because the defendant chose to
assert a contract defense, will have that forum taken away.
167id.

168
169

1 d.at 354.
Referring to the copyright issues.

170
Id. at 354.
171 Bassett, 204 F.3d at 354.
172
Id. The Bassett court made it clear that the defendant may want the action in

the federal court because of that court's experience with the Copyright Act. It
also explained that, post-pleading, the court may discover its supposed lack of
jurisdiction. Indeed, it may enable the plaintiff to escape from a "bad result" at
trial by choosing to raise the issue on post-trial motion or even on appeal. The
Schoenberg rule opens the door to the difficulty of a federal court discovering
the jurisdictional issue late in the litigation or on appeal, and the injustice and
inefficiency that may result should a judgment on the merits be overturned by a
of a lack of jurisdiction.
finding
173
id.
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Without saying as much, the Bassett court appeared
concerned with the feasibility of resolving the subject matter
jurisdictional issue near the beginning of the suit, as well as the
inability to decide that issue without an adjudication of the
copyright infringement and breach of contract claims.
Any doubt as to the basis for the Bassett court's concerns with
Schoenberg were erased by the court when it reaffirmed TB.
1 75
Harms and the principles which governed the rule in that case.
,,174

Those principles may be stated as follows; 1) The "suit arises
under the law that creates the cause of action;"' 176 and, 2)
jurisdiction is to be decided based upon the allegations of the
plaintiff's complaint. 77 Ultimately, the Bassett court concluded
that "[w]hen a complaint alleges a claim or seeks a remedy
provided by
the Copyright Act, federal jurisdiction is properly
178
invoked."'
174 Id. In addition to an examination into the incidental nature of the copyright

claim, the Bassett court was concerned about the ability of a federal court to
answer questions at the outset of the litigation, such as whether the contract
breach was of a covenant or a condition, and if of a covenant, the importance
and seriousness of the alleged breach.
175 TB. Harms, Co., 339 F.2d at 828. See also supra notes 78-80 and
accompanying
text.
176 Am. Well Works Co., 241 U.S. at 260.
177 Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 (citing Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U.S. 74, 75 (1914)(a
federal court must determine from the face of plaintiff s complaint whether it
has jurisdiction under a jurisdictional statute); The Fair v. Kohler Die &
Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913)("[T]he party who brings a suit is master
to decide what law he will rely upon, and therefore does determine whether he
will bring a 'suit arising under' the patent or other law of the United States by
his declaration or bill.")).
178 Bassett, 204 F.3d at 355 (citing TB. Harms,339 F.2d at 828). It is not
material that the complaint or defendant's response raise the prospect that the
infringement claim arose from an alleged contractual breach or within the
context of such breach. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
In an unpublished opinion issued subsequent to Bassett, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote of the contrast between the T.B. Harms
and Schoenberg tests: "The TB. Harms test differed significantly from the
essence-of-the-dispute or merely-incidental test [used in Schoenberg]. The
analysis under TB. Harms turns on what is alleged on theface of the complaint,
while the essence-of-the-dispute or merely-incidental test looks rather at what
defense will be proffered." Parachute Press, Inc. v. Scholastic, Inc., 225 F.3d
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When the Bassett court applied TB. Harms to the facts before it,
the plaintiffs allegation of the Copyright Act violation was
important. 179 In other words, the defendants used the plaintiffs
copyrighted script without her authorization to produce and exhibit
a motion picture film-.18 0 The fact that the plaintiff sought
injunctive relief under the Copyright Act was equally as
significant.

181

Finally, the court of appeals in Bassett saw on the facts of the
case "an excellent example of the shortcomings of the Schoenberg
test." 182 In this regard, the plaintiff sought an injunction under the
provisions of the Copyright Act. 183 Under Schoenberg, should the
court find the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim "incidental
to" a contracts dispute and dismiss the copyright claim on
jurisdictional grounds, the plaintiff would be foreclosed from
further pursuing the claim and the injunctive remedy provided in
the Copyright Act. 184 Finally, the Bassett court decried that a

federal court is "ill-equipped to make the judgments called185for by
,
....
the Schoenberg test at the early stage of the litigation

646, No.99-7235, 2000 WL 1198004, at *1 (2d Cir. Aug. 22, 2000) (quoting
Bassett, 204 F.3d at 349).
In vacating the judgment of the district court, which had dismissed the
plaintiff s complaint on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1338, the ParachutePress court held that Bassett reaffirmed the TB.
Harms test and so the district court had subject matter jurisdiction of the case
because the plaintiff's second amended complaint "alleged copyright
infiingement and it sought relief granted by the Copyright Act." Id.
179 Bassett, 204 F.3d at 356.
180Id.
at 343. See also supranotes6-18 and accompanying text (elaborating on
the facts in Bassett).
' Id.at 356.
112 Id. at 356 n.14.
183 Id. at 356. See also 17 U.S.C. §502(a)(1996 & Supp. 2001).
114 Bassett,204 F.3d at 356.
185 Id. at 356 n.14. In concluding its analysis of the shortcomings of
Schoenberg, the Bassett court summarized the issue that a federal court may be
unable to resolve early in the lawsuit. These are "Whether the copyright
concerns are in fact incidental; whether contractual understandings were
breached; whether these breaches were of conditions or covenants; if the latter,
whether the breaches were of sufficient importance to justify rescission or
forfeiture; and whether the claim requires construction of the [Copyright] Act."
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Although it appears that TB. Harms, as reaffirmed in Bassett,
marks a trend among United States Courts of Appeal when
approaching the "arising under" issue in § 1338(a), it remains
18 6
unclear among those courts to what cases the rule should apply.
This lack of clarity has been lessened somewhat by the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia's opinion in
87
Scandinavian Satellite System, AS, v. Prime TVLimited.1
c. Limits to the Bassett Approach
In Prime TV Limited, the plaintiffs complaint alleged a
copyright infringement claim and sought remedies authorized
under the Copyright Act. 188 The complaint also asserted a contract
claim and remedy, specifically, that a Joint Venture Agreement 1be
89
rescinded as a result of one of the defendants' wrongful conduct.
On these facts, the district court dismissed the plaintiffs action
holding that it did "not 'arise under' the federal copyright law
[]."190 Therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction. 191 In reaching this
result, the court found that the Bassett approach was
inapplicable.19 2 Unlike the Bassett plaintiffs complaint, the
plaintiff in Prime TV was not alleging a contract breach which led
to copyright infiingement. Rather, the Prime TV plaintiff was
alleging that duress voided a contract as a result of which plaintiff
was entitled to the remedy of rescission. 193 Under no
circumstances, then, would the Prime TV plaintiff have a claim for
186 Scandinavian Satellite Sys. v. Prime TV Ltd., 146 F. Supp.2d 6 (D.D.C.

2001) (stating that Bassett exemplifies the trend).
117
146atF.15.
Supp.2d
6 (D.D.C.to2001).
88 Id.
It is interesting
note that the defendants did not challenge
plaintiff's characterization of the case as a suit that "arises under" the Copyright
Act. Rather they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of "lack of personal
jurisdiction, international comity, and the existence of a forum selection clause
in the contracts. . ." which were involved in the case. Id. at 12.
'89 Id. at 16.
'90 Id. at 18.
191Id. at 13-14.
192 ScandinavianSatelliteSys., 146 F. Supp.2d at 13.
193
Id.
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194

copyright infringement.
The reasoning and conclusion reached by the Prime TV Limited
court suggest that there are limits to Bassett. Prime TV appears
limited to copyright owners who license their rights to others who,
in turn, forfeit their license by a breach of its terms. As a result,
further use of the copyrighted materials is without the authority 1of
95
the copyright owner and so causes copyright infiingement.
When, however, the resolution of the contract issue under no
circumstances results in copyright infringement,196the federal court
lacks "arising under" subject matter jurisdiction.
IV. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND COMNENTS

There are two approaches lower federal courts have used when
resolving the § 1338(a) subject matter jurisdictional issue in
copyright and contract cases. Under the first, the court determines
which claim or issue, contract or copyright, is the "essence of the
dispute."' 197 When making this determination, the court looks not
only to the face of the plaintiffs complaint, but also to the
defendant's pleading or response and supporting documents that
may aid in deciding the "essence" issue. 198 Under the second
approach, the court resolves the jurisdictional issue by examining
the face of the plaintiff s complaint only. 199 A copyright claim or

194

Zd. at 18. The Prime TV court recognized that the situation before was
unique. According to the court the plaintiff, if prevailing on the contracts claim
would have the contracts remedy available to it only because once the contract
was rescinded plaintiff would become the parent company of the alleged
copyright infringer. The rule would then apply that the parent cannot sue its

wholly owned subsidiary for infringement.
95

Id. at 16.

19 6 Id.
197

See generallyBaptiste, 910 F. Supp. at 277. See supra notes 83-112 and
accompanying text.
198
See generally Baptiste, 910 F. Supp. at 277. See supra notes 83-112 and
accompanying text.
199 See generally Vestron, Inc., 839 F.2d at 1380. See supranotes 114-118 and
accompanying text.
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issue stated gives the court § 1338(a) jurisdiction. 0 °
Each approach has certain positive characteristics. The "essence
of the dispute," once resolved, ensures that the court has before it a
copyright claim or issue of sufficient significance to the outcome
of the dispute to justify taking exclusive jurisdiction. The "face of
the complaint" approach ensures that the plaintiff has a forum
available in which the action can be litigated to judgment.
Because the approach focuses on the plaintiffs complaint, the
jurisdictional question is resolved early in the litigation, allowing
the parties and the court to focus on the merits of the claim and
any defenses. The second approach, as compared to the first, is
therefore more efficient.
Detracting from the first approach is its complexity. The
resolution of the "essence of the dispute" issue strikingly
resembles a determination on the merits of the litigation. 20 1 The
second approach is also flawed. Jurisdiction is taken based on the
face of the plaintiffs complaint. Facts deduced subsequent to the
pleadings stage of the proceeding, however, may disclose that no
copyright claim or issue was raised in the case. A dismissal on
jurisdictional grounds is inappropriate. Rather, the court, once
having found jurisdiction, should enter judgment on the merits
against the plaintiff finding that there is no copyright claim or
issue.
With each approach having both positive as well as negative
aspects, it is not surprising that lower federal courts have yet to
reach an agreement on which approach to follow. It may serve
those courts that follow the "essence of the dispute" approach to
consider distinguishing the § 1338(a) issue from the question of
deciding the copyright claim or issue on its merits. In this regard,
it appears that this approach blurs that distinction, if not ignores it.
The result is that a dismissal of the plaintiffs action on the
jurisdictional grounds that the copyright claim or issue is not the
"essence of the dispute" leaves open the question of whether there
200 See generally Vestron, Inc., 839 F.2d at 1380. See supra notes 114-118 and

accompanying text.
See generally Schoenberg, 971 F.2d at 926. See supranote 154 and
accompanying text.
201
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is a valid copyright claim or issue at all. That question, of course,
cannot be resolved before the court of any state. 20 2 It would be
better, therefore, for the "essence of the dispute" courts to consider
whether the decision they are making is one on the merits versus
one merely affecting the proper forum for the plaintiffs action.
Dismissal would be appropriate only when the court is persuaded
that the circumstances will show that no copyright claim or issue
exists in the case. That dismissal, in turn, is for lack ofjurisdiction
and not for want of a copyright claim or issue.
Those lower federal courts that follow the "face of the
complaint" approach may also want to consider the issue that they
are deciding. As suggested by the district court in Prime TV
Limited, if, as the plaintiffs complaint discloses, the circumstances
will not lead to a copyright claim or issue, the court should not
take jurisdiction. If the circumstances lead to that claim or issue,
however, the court should not dismiss the complaint for the lack of
jurisdiction.20 3
In sum, the "essence of the dispute" courts would benefit from a
sharper distinction between the § 1338(a) jurisdictional issue and a
merits determination. The "face of the complaint" courts, on the
other hand, must recognize when circumstances may not lead to a
copyright claim or issue. Thereafter, those courts should be willing
to dispose of the case for lack of jurisdiction at the pleading stage
of the litigation.

202

The federal court's jurisdiction over the action arising under the Copyright
Act is "exclusive." 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (1993 & Supp. 2001).
203 See supra notes 188-197 and accompanying text.
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